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I. INTRODUCTION
The organizational principles driving the evolution and development of natural and social large-scale systems, including populations of bacteria, ant colonies, herds of predators and human societies, rely on the cooperation of a large population of unrelated agents [1] [2] [3] . Even if cooperation seems to be a ubiquitous property of social systems, its spontaneous emergence is still a puzzle for scientists since cooperative behaviors are constantly threatened by the natural tendency of individuals towards self-preservation and the never-ceasing competition among agents for resources and success. The preference of selfishness over cooperation is also due to the higher short-term benefits that a single (defector) agent obtains by taking advantage of the efforts of cooperating agents. Obviously, the imitation of such a selfish (but rational) conduct drives the system towards a state in which the higher benefits associated to cooperation are no longer achievable, with dramatic consequences for the whole population. Consequently, the relevant question to address is why cooperative behavior is so common, and which are the circumstances and the mechanisms that allow it to emerge and persist.
In the last decades, the study of the elementary mech-anisms fostering the emergence of cooperation in populations subjected to evolutionary dynamics has attracted a lot of interest in ecology, biology and social sciences [4, 5] . The problem has been tackled through the formulation of simple games that neglect the microscopic differences among distinct social and natural systems, thus providing a general framework for the analysis of evolutionary dynamics [6] [7] [8] . Most of the classical models studied within this framework made the simplifying assumption that social systems are characterized by homogeneous structures, in which the interaction probability is the same for any pair of agents and constant over time [9] . However, this assumption has been proven false for real systems, as the theory of complex networks has revealed that most natural and social networks exhibit large heterogeneity and non-trivial interconnection topologies [10] [11] [12] [13] . It has been also shown that the structure of a network has dramatic effects on the dynamical processes taking place on it, so that complex networks analysis has become a fundamental tool in epidemiology, computer science, neuroscience and social sciences [14] [15] [16] .
The study of evolutionary games on complex topologies has allowed a new way out for cooperation to survive in some paradigmatic cases such as the Prisoner's Dilemma [17] [18] [19] [20] or the Public Goods games [21] [22] [23] . In particular, it has been pointed out that the complex patterns of interactions among the agents found in real social networks, such as scale-free distributions of the number of contacts per individual or the presence of tightly-knit social groups, tend to favor the emergence and persistence of cooperation. This line of research, which brings together the tools and methods from the statistical mechanics of complex networks and the classical models of evolutionary game dynamics, has effectively became a new discipline, known as Evolutionary Graph Theory [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] .
Recently, the availability of longitudinal spatiotemporal information about human interactions and social relationships [29] [30] [31] [32] has revealed that social systems are not static objects at all: contacts among individuals are usually volatile and fluctuate over time [33, 34] , faceto-face interactions are bursty and intermittent [35, 36] , agents motion exhibits long spatio-temporal correlations [37] [38] [39] . Consequently, static networks, constructed by aggregating in a single graph all the interactions observed among a group of individuals across a given period, can be only considered as simplified models of real networked systems. For this reason, time-varying graphs have been lately introduced as a more realistic framework to encode time-dependent relationships [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] . In particular, a time-varying graph is an ordered sequence of graphs defined over a fixed number of nodes, where each graph in the sequence aggregates all the edges observed among the nodes within a certain temporal interval. The introduction of time as a new dimension of the graph gives rise to a richer structure. Therefore, new metrics specifically designed to characterize the temporal properties of graph sequences have been proposed, and most of the classical metrics defined for static graphs have been extended to the time-varying case [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] . Lately, the study of dynamical processes taking place on timeevolving graphs has shown that temporal correlations and contact recurrence play a fundamental role in diverse settings such as random walks dynamics [50] [51] [52] , the spreading of information and diseases [53] [54] [55] and synchronization [56] .
Here we study how the level of cooperation is affected by taking into account the more realistic picture of social system provided by time-varying graphs instead of the classical (static) network representation of interactions. We consider a family of social dilemmas, including the Hawk-Dove, the Stag Hunt and the Prisoner's Dilemma games, played by agents connected through a time-evolving topology obtained from real traces of human interactions. We analyze the effect of temporal resolution and correlations on the emergence of cooperation in two paradigmatic data sets of human proximity, namely the MIT Reality Mining [29] and the INFO-COM'06 [30] co-location traces. We find that the level of cooperation achievable on time-varying graphs crucially depends on the interplay between the speed at which the network changes and the typical time-scale at which agents update their strategy. In particular, cooperation is facilitated when agents keep playing the same strategy for longer intervals, while too frequent strategy updates tend to favor defectors. Our results also suggest that the presence of temporal correlations in the creation and maintenance of interactions hinders cooperation, so that synthetic time-varying networks in which link persistence is broken usually exhibit a considerably higher level of cooperation. Finally, we show that both the average size of the giant component and the weighted temporal clustering calculated across different consecutive time-windows are indeed good predictors of the level of cooperation attainable on time-varying graphs.
II. RESULTS

A. Evolutionary Dynamics of Social Dilemmas
We focus on the emergence of cooperation in systems whose individuals face a social dilemma between two possible strategies: Cooperation (C) and Defection (D). A large class of social dilemmas can be formulated as in [18] via a two-parameter game described by the payoff matrix:
where R, S, T and P represent the payoffs corresponding to the various possible encounters between two players. Namely, when the two players choose to cooperate they both receive a payoff R = 1 (for Reward), while if they both decide to defect they get P = 0 (for Punishment). When a cooperator faces a defector it gets the payoff S (for Sucker) while the defector gets T (for Temptation).
In this version of the game the payoffs S and T are the only two free parameters of the model, and their respective values induce an ordering of the four payoffs which determines the type of social dilemma. We have in fact three different scenarios. When T > 1 and S > 0, defecting against a cooperator provides the largest payoff, and this corresponds to the Hawk-Dove game. For T < 1 and S < 0, cooperating with a defector is the worst case, and we have the Stag Hunt game. Finally, for T > 1 and S < 0, when a defector plays with a cooperator we have at the same time the largest (for the defector) and the smallest (for the cooperator) payoffs, and the game corresponds to the Prisoner's Dilemma. In this work we consider the three types of games by exploring the parameter region T ∈ [0, 2] and S ∈ [−1, 1].
In real social systems, each individual has more than one social contact at the same time. This situation is usually represented [26] by associating each player i, i = 1, 2, . . . , N to a node of a static network, with adjacency matrix A = {a ij }, whose edges indicate pairs of individuals playing the game. In this framework, a player i selects a strategy, plays a number of games equal to the number of her neighbors k i = j a ij and accumulates the payoffs associated to each of these interactions. Obviously, the outcome of playing with a neighbor depends both on the strategiy selected by node i and that of the neighbor, according to the payoff matrix in Eq. 1. When all the individuals have played with all their neighbors in the network, they update their strategies as a result of an evolutionary process, i.e., according to the total collected payoff. Namely, each individual i compares her cumulated payoff p i with that of one of her neighbors, say j, chosen at random. The probability P i→j that agent i adopts the strategy of her neighbor j increases with the difference (p j − p i ) (see Methods for details).
The games defined by the payoff matrix in Eq. 1 and using a payoff-based strategy update rule have been thoroughly investigated in static networks with different topologies. The main result is that, when the network is fixed and agent strategies are allowed to evolve over time, the level of cooperation increases with the heterogeneity of the degree distribution of the network, being scale-free networks the most paradigmatic promoters of cooperation [17] [18] [19] . However, in most cases human contacts and social interactions are intrinsically dynamic and varying in time, a feature which has profound consequences on any process taking place over a social network. We explore here the role of time on the emergence of cooperation in time-varying networks.
B. Temporal patterns of social interactions
We consider two data sets describing the temporal patterns of human interactions at two different time scales. The first data set has been collected during the MIT Reality Mining experiment [29] , and includes information about spatial proximity of a group of students, staff, and faculty members at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, over a period of six months. The resulting timedependent network has N = 100 nodes and consists of a time-ordered sequence {G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G M } of M = 41291 graphs (snapshots), each graph representing proximity interactions during a time interval of τ = 5 minutes. Remember that each graph G m , m = 1, . . . , M accounts for all the instantaneous interactions taking place in the temporal interval [(m−1)τ, mτ ]. The second data set describes co-location patterns, over a period of four days, between the participants of the INFOCOM'06 conference [30] . In this case, the resulting time-dependent network has N = 78 nodes, and contains a sequence of M = 2880 graphs obtained by detecting users co-location every τ = 2 minutes.
The frequency of social contacts is illustrated in Fig. 1  (panels A and B) , where we report the number of active links at time t, E active , as a function of time. In the MIT Reality Mining data set, social activity exhibits daily and weekly periodicities, respectively due to home-work and working days-weekends cycles. In addition to these rhythms, we notice a non-stationary behavior which is clearly visible when we plot the activity averaged over a 1-month moving window (red line in panel A). In the IN-FOCOM'06 data set we observe a daily periodicity and a non-stationary trend which is due, in this case, to a decreasing social activity in the last days of the conference as seen by aggregating activity over 24 hours (red line in panel B). We also report in Fig. 1 (panels C and D) the distributions P (σ) of contact duration, σ ≡ σ on , and of inter-contact time, σ ≡ σ of f (i.e. the interval between two consecutive appearances of an edge). As it is often the case for human dynamics [35] , the distributions of contact duration and inter-contact time are heterogeneous. For the MIT data set, an active edge can persist up to an entire day, while inactive intervals can last over multiple days and weeks; similar patterns are observed in the INFOCOM'06 data set, where some edges remain active up to one entire day and inter-contact times span almost the whole observation interval. Edge activity exhibits significant correlations over long periods of time.
In particular, the autocorrelation function of the time series of edge activity shows a slow decay, up to lags of 10 − 12 hours for the MIT data set, and of 6 − 8 hours for INFOCOM'06, after which the daily periodicity becomes dominant (figure not reported).
C. Evolution of Cooperation in Time-varying Networks
To simulate the game on a time-varying topology {G m } m=1,...,M , we start from a random distribution of strategies, so that each individual initially behaves either as a cooperator or as a defector, with equal probability. The simulation proceeds in rounds, where each round consists of a playing stage followed by a strategy update. In the first stage, each agent plays with all her neighbors on the first graph of the sequence, namely on G 1 , and accumulates the payoff according to the matrix in Eq. 1. Then the graph changes, and the agents employ the same strategies to play with all their neighbors in the second graph of the sequence, G 2 . The new payoffs are summed to those obtained in the previous iteration. The same procedure is then repeated n times with n such that n · τ is equal to a chosen interval ∆t, which is the strategy update interval. At this point, the playing stage terminates and agent strategies are updated. Namely, each agent compares the net payoff accumulated during the previous n time steps with that of one of her neighbors chosen at random. In particular, we adopt here the so-called Fermi Rule [57, 58] with a parameter β = 1 (see Methods). We have checked that the results are quite robust, and we obtain qualitatively similar outcomes for a wide range of β. After the agents have updated their strategy, their payoff is reset to 0 and they start another round, during the subsequent time interval of length ∆t = n · τ , as described above.
To evaluate the degree of cooperation obtained for a given value of the strategy update interval ∆t and a pair of values (T, S), we compute the average fraction of cooperators C(T, S) ∆t :
where N i c is the number of cooperators found at time i · ∆t and Q is the total number of rounds played. In general, we set Q large enough to guarantee that the system reaches a stationary state.
We have simulated the system using different values of ∆t. Notice that for smaller value of ∆t the time-scale of strategy update is comparable with that of the graph evolution, while when ∆t is equal to the entire observation period M τ the game is effectively played on a static topology, namely the weighted aggregated graph corresponding to the whole observation interval. We focus here on the top panels of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 , where we show how the average fraction of cooperators depends on the parameters S and T and on the length ∆t of the strategy update interval. We considered six values of ∆t for the MIT Reality Mining data set, from ∆t = 1 hour up to the whole observation interval, and eight values for INFOCOM'06, ranging from minutes up to the aggregate network.
At first glance, we notice that the rightmost diagrams in both figures, which correspond to ∆t = M τ , are in perfect agreement with the results about evolutionary games played on static topologies reported in the literature (see e.g. [18, 26] ). If we look at the cooperation diagrams obtained by increasing the value of ∆t in the original sequences of graphs (top panels of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3) , we notice that, for any pair (T, S), a larger update interval corresponds to a higher fraction of cooperators. In particular, for MIT Reality Mining (Fig. 2) the fraction of cooperators increases up until ∆t = 2 months, after which the cooperation diagram is practically indistinguishable from that obtained on the static aggregated graph. For INFOCOM'06, instead, a strategy update interval larger than 2 hours already produces a cooperation diagram similar to that obtained in the aggregated graph. These results indicate that defectors actually take advantage from the volatility of edges, and that cooperation can emerge only if the strategy update interval is large enough. We will check this issue later in section II D.
As we pointed out above, edge activation patterns show non-trivial correlations. To highlight the effects of temporal correlations and of periodicity in the appearance of links in the real data sets, we have simulated the games also on randomized time-varying graphs and on synthetic networks generated through the activitydriven model [60] . The results for randomized graphs and activity-driven graphs are reported, respectively, in the middle and in the bottom panels of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 .
Randomized time-varying graphs are obtained by uniformly reshuffling the original sequences of snapshots. In this case the frequency of each pairwise contact is preserved equal to that of the original data set. However, the temporal correlations of these contacts, namely the persistence of an edge during consecutive time snapshots, are completely washed out. As expected, for ∆t = M τ the cooperation diagrams obtained on the reshuffled se- quences (middle rightmost panels of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 ) are identical to those obtained on the corresponding original data sets (top rightmost panels). In fact, when ∆t = M τ each agent plays with all the contacts she has seen in the whole observation interval, with the corresponding weights, before updating her strategy. Since, in this particular case the frequencies of contacts are the only ingredients responsible for the emergence of cooperation, and such frequencies are the same both in the original data set and in the reshuffled version, the results of the original and randomized graphs have to be identical. Conversely, for smaller values of ∆t, the importance of the temporal correlations of each pairwise contact becomes clear since the cooperation diagrams for randomized and original networks are very different in both MIT Reality Mining and INFOCOM'06. In fact for the randomized graphs, the cooperation levels at ∆t = 1 week and ∆t = 1 hour, respectively, become comparable to those obtained for ∆t = M τ . This points out that destroying the temporal correlations of each pairwise contact enhances cooperation.
Little differences are observed (compared to the case of randomized graphs) when using activity-driven synthetic networks (results shown in the bottom panels of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 ). In this case not only temporal correlations are washed out, but also the microscopic structure of each snapshot is replaced by a graph having a similar density of links. This rewiring distributes links more heterogeneously than in the original and the randomized sequences (see Methods for details). The cooperation diagrams of activity-driven networks show a further increase of the cooperation levels for even smaller values of the strategy update interval, ∆t, than in the case of Random graphs. Namely, for ∆t = 1 day in Reality Mining ( Fig. 2) and for ∆t = 30 minutes in INFOCOM (Fig. 3) we already recover the cooperation levels of ∆t = M τ .
The results reported in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 suggest that the ordering, persistence and distribution of edges over consecutive time-window are all fundamental ingredients for the success of cooperation. In general, a small value of ∆t in the original data sets corresponds to playing the game on a sparse graph, possibly comprising a number of small components, in which agents are connected to a small neighborhood that persists rather unaltered over consecutive time windows. The small size of the isolated clusters and the persistence of the connections within them allow defectors to spread their strategy efficiently. In the following, we will analyze this hypothesis by characterizing the structural patterns of the original time varying graph, its randomized version and the activity-driven synthetic network.
D. Structural analysis of time varying networks
In order to understand the dependence of cooperation on the strategy update interval ∆t, we plot in Fig. 4 the average fraction, S , of the nodes found in the giant component of the graphs as a function of ∆t, for the original data sets and for the reshuffled and synthetic sequences of snapshots. In general, for a given value of ∆t, the giant component of graphs corresponding to randomized sequences or to the activity-driven model is larger than that of the graphs in the original ordering. The break down of temporal correlations between consecutive time snapshots in randomized and activity-driven networks produces an increase in the number of ties between different agents of the population even for small values of ∆t. In addition, the more homogeneous distribution of links within the snapshots of the activity-driven network further increases the mixing of the agents and thus enlarges the size of the giant component compared to the randomized graphs.
In Fig. 4 we also plot the overall level of cooperation at a given aggregation scale ∆t, C tot (∆t), defined as:
Notice that C tot (∆t) is divided by the value C tot (M τ ) Black squares correspond to randomly reshuffled sequences and red triangles to activity-driven synthetic networks. In both datasets we notice that, for small values of ∆t, real data display an higher value of clustering (persistence) than synthetic cases followed by a transition value of ∆t above which we observe a rapid increase in the clustering of synthetic cases such that the previous situation is inverted.
corresponding to the whole observation interval, so that C tot ∈ [0, 1]. The value of ∆t at which S is comparable with the number of nodes N , i.e. when S 1, coincides with the value of ∆t at which the cooperation diagram becomes indistinguishable from that obtained for the aggregate network, C tot (∆t) 1, for both the original and the reshuffled sequences of snapshots. This result confirms that the size of the giant connected component, of the graph corresponding to a given aggregation interval, plays a central role in determining the level of cooperation sustainable by the system, in agreement with the experiments discussed in [59] for the case of static complex networks.
It is also interesting to investigate the role of edge correlations on the observed cooperation level. To this aim, we analyze the temporal clustering (see Methods), which captures the average tendency of edges to persist over time. In Fig. 5 we plot the evolution of the temporal clustering as a function of the strategy update interval ∆t. The results reveal clearly that, for small values ∆t, the persistence of ties in the two original data sets is larger than in the randomized and the activity-driven graphs. In this regime the average giant component is small in both the real and randomized cases, thus pointing out that the temporally connected components are composed of small clusters. However, the larger temporal clustering observed for small ∆t in the original data implies that the node composition of these small components changes very slowly compared to the faster mixing observed in the random data sets. These are then the two ingredients depressing the cooperation levels in the original data as compared to the random cases: the size of the giant component and how much such components change even at fixed size. As further confirmation, we notice that link persistence grows in a similar way as ∆t increases in randomized and activity-driven networks. This growth points out that the randomization of snapshots in one null model and the redistribution of links in the other one make the ties more stable as ∆t increases. Instead, the results found on the original data sets suggest (in particular for the case of INFOCOM) that ties are rather volatile, being active for a number of consecutive snapshots and then inactive for a large time interval. In randomized and activity-driven graphs the stabilization of ties together with the fast increase in the size of the giant component make the resulting time-varying graph much more similar to static networks, thus improving the survival of cooperation, as compared to the volatile and strongly fragmented scenario of the real time-varying graphs.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Although the impact of network topology on the onset and persistence of cooperation has been extensively studied in the last years, the recent availability of data sets with time-resolved information about social interactions allows a deeper investigation of the impact on evolutionary dynamics of time-evolving social structures. Here we have addressed two crucial questions: does the interplay between graph evolution and strategy update affect the classical results about the enhancement of cooperation driven by network reciprocity? And what is the role of the time-correlations of temporal networks in the evolution of cooperation? The results of the simulations confirm that, for all the four social dilemmas studied in this work, cooperation is seriously hindered when (i) agent strategy is updated too frequently with respect to the typical time-scale of agent interaction and (ii) real-world timecorrelations are present. This phenomenon is a con-sequence of the relatively small size of the giant component of the graphs obtained at small aggregation intervals. However, when the temporal sequence of social contacts is replaced by time-varying networks preserving the original activity attributes of links or nodes but breaking the original temporal correlations, the structural patterns of the network at a given time-scale of strategy update changes dramatically from those observed in real data. As a consequence, the effects of temporal resolution over cooperation are smoothed and, by breaking the real temporal correlations of social contacts, cooperation can emerge and persist also for moderately small strategy update frequencies. This result highlights that both the interplay of strategy update and graph evolution and the presence of temporal correlations, such as edge persistence and recurrence, seem to have fundamental effects on the emergence of cooperation.
Our findings suggest that the frequency at which the connectivity of a given system are sampled has to be carefully chosen, according with the typical time-scale of the social interaction dynamics. For instance, as stock brokers might decide to change strategy after just a couple of interactions, other processes like trust formation in business or collaboration networks are likely to be better described as the result of multiple subsequent interactions. These conclusions are also supported by the results of a recent paper of Ribeiro et al. [52] in which the effects of temporal aggregation interval ∆t in the behavior of random walks are studied. Also, the fundamental role played by the real-data time correlations in dynamical processes on the graph calls for more models of temporal networks and for a better understanding of their nature.
In a nutshell, the arguments indicating network reciprocity as the social promoter of cooperator have to be revisited when considering time-varying graphs. In particular, one should always bear in mind that both the overand the under-sampling of time-evolving social graph and the use of the finest/coarsest temporal resolution could substantially bias the results of a game-theoretic model played on the corresponding network. These results pave the way to a more detailed investigation of social dilemmas in systems where not only structural but also temporal correlations are incorporated in the interaction maps.
IV. METHODS
A. MIT Reality Mining data set
The data set describes proximity interactions collected through the use of Bluetooth-enabled phones [29] . The phones were distributed to a group of 100 users, composed by 75 MIT Media Laboratory students and 25 faculty members. Each device had a unique tag and was able to detect the presence and identity of other devices within a range of 5-10 meters. The interactions, intended as proximity of devices, were recorded over a period of about six months. In addition to the interaction data, the original dataset included also information regarding call logs, other Bluetooth devices within detection range, the cell tower to which the phones was connected and information about phone usage and status. Here, we consider only the contact network data, ignoring any other contextual metadata. The resulting time-varying network is an ordered sequence of 41291 graphs, each having N=100 nodes. Each graph corresponds to a proximity scan taken every 5 minutes. An edge between two nodes indicates that the two corresponding devices were within detection range of each other during that interval. We refer to such links as active. During the entire recorded period, 2114 different edges have been detected as active, at least once. This corresponds to the aggregate graph having a large average node degree k 42. However, this is an artefact of the aggregation; the single snapshots tend to be very sparse, usually containing between 100 and 200 active edges.
B. INFOCOM'06 data set
The data set consists of proximity measurements collected during the IEEE INFOCOM'06 conference held in a hotel in Barcelona in 2006 [30] . A sample of 78 participants from a range of different companies and institutions were chosen and equipped with a portable Bluetooth device, Intel iMote, able to detect similar devices nearby. Area "inquiries" were performed by the devices every 2 minutes, with a random delay or anticipation of 20 seconds. The delay/anticipation mechanism was implemented in order to avoid synchronous measurements, because, while actively sweeping the area, devices could not be detected by other devices. A total number of 2730 distinct edges were recorded as active at least once in the observation interval, while the number of edges active at a given time is significantly lower, varying between 0 and 200, depending on the time of the day.
C. Strategy update rule
The Fermi Rule consists in the following updating strategy. A player i chooses one of her neighbors j at random and copies the strategy of j with a probability:
where (p j − p i ) is the difference between the payoffs of the two players, and β is a parameter controlling the smoothness of the transition from P i→j = 0 for small values of (p j −p i ), to P i→j = 1 for large values of (p j −p i ).
Notice that for β 1 we obtain P i→j 0.5 regardless of the value of (p j − p i ), which effectively corresponds to a random strategy update. On the other hand, when β 1 then P i→j Θ(p j − p i ), being Θ(x) the Heaviside step function. In this limit, the strategy update is driven only by the ordering of the payoff values.
D. Activity-driven model
The activity-driven model, introduced in Ref. [60] , is a simple model to generate time-varying graphs starting from the empirical observation of the activity of each node, in terms of number of contacts established per unit time. Given a characteristic time-window ∆t, one measures the activity potential x i of each agent i, defined as the total number of interactions (edges) established by i in a time-window of length ∆t divided by the total number of interactions established on average by all agents in the same time interval. Then, each agent is assigned an activity a i = ηx i , which is the probability per unit time to create a new connection or contact with any another agent j. The coefficient η is a rescaling factor, whose value is appropriately set in order to ensure that the total number of active nodes per unit time in the system is equal to η x N , where N is the total number of agents. Notice that η effectively determines the average number of connections in a temporal snapshot whose length corresponds to the resolution of the original data set.
The model works as follows. At each time t the graph G t starts with N disconnected nodes. Then, each node i becomes active with probability a i ∆t and connects to m other randomly selected nodes. At the following timestep, all the connections in G t are deleted, and a new snapshot is sampled.
Notice that time-varying graphs constructed through the activity-driven model preserve the average degree of nodes in each snapshot, but impose that connections have, on average, a duration equal to ∆t, effectively washing out any temporal correlation among edges.
E. Temporal clustering
Several metrics have been lately proposed to measure the tendency of the edges of a time-varying graph to persist over time. One of the most widely used is the unweighted temporal clustering, introduced in Ref. [44] , which for a node i of a time-varying graph is defined as:
where a t ij are the elements the adjacency matrix of the time-varying graph at snapshot t, k t i is the total number of edges incident on node i at snapshot t and T is the duration of the whole observation interval. Notice that γ i takes values in [0, 1] . In general, a higher value of γ i is obtained when the interactions of node i persist longer in time, while γ i tends to zero if the interactions of i are highly volatile.
If each snapshot of the time-varying graph is a weighted network, where the weight ω t ij represents the strength if the interaction between node i and node j at time t, we can define a weighted version of the temporal clustering coefficient as follows:
Finally, if we focus more on the persistence of interaction strength across subsequent network snapshots, we can define the extremal temporal clustering as:
where by considering the minimum between ω t ij and ω t+1 ij one can distinguish between persistent interactions having constant strength over time and those interactions having more volatile strength. As in our case social interactions are seen to be highly volatile in real data sets, the extremal version of the temporal clustering seems to be the best choice to unveil the persistence of social ties at short time scales.
